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Article: 
It has become a commonplace to describe growing Western engagement with Buddhism as a search for relief 
from spiritual vacuity and deep dissatisfaction produced by modernity. Buddhism in this narrative figures as 
either pre-modern or timeless, with Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns in particular symbolizing an otherwise 
lost authenticity. The search for “the authentic” within the popular imaginary conflates Tibet and Buddhism, 
simultaneously divorcing both from modernity and ironically spawning an industry devoted to what Chögyam 
Trungpa termed spiritual materialism: religious texts, meditation products, dating services, retreat centers, 
guided tours, and the like that cannot ever complete the consumers‟ identification with a pre-colonial, Buddhist 
ordained, “Tibetan.” Circulating among these “enlightenment” products is an increasing selection of Tibetan 
autobiographies produced with spiritual, inspirational, and political goals. Looking specifically at Ani Pachen 
and Adelaide Donnelley‟s Sorrow Mountain: The Journey of a Tibetan Warrior Nun (2000), I analyze the 
confluence and conflicts of these goals through the book‟s paratextual and literary features. Although Sorrow 
Mountain deploys images of “authenticity” noted above, acquiescing to the seduction of the authentic 
reproduces the split between religious tradition and secular modernity and furthers the reader‟s desire for what 
must remain literally a lost cause. To avoid such vacating of anti-colonial political will against Chinese control 
of Tibet as well as to provide grounds for an imaginative affiliation with Ani Pachen, I argue for an expansion 
of feminist and postcolonial critical discourses to recognize the form of Buddhist subjectivity Ani Pachen 
represents. 
 
In “Radical Histories and the Question of Enlightenment Rationalism: Some Recent Critiques of Subaltern 
Studies,” Dipesh Chakrabarty, member of the Subaltern Studies collective and self-identified “male, Bengali, 
(Hindu) middle-class Marxist (of some kind!),” articulates the problem of conceptualizing religious 
identifications within an Enlightenment-inspired, “hyper-rational” modernity: “The problem is…that we do not 
have analytical categories in academic discourse that do justice to the real, everyday and multiple „connections‟ 
we have to what we, in becoming modern, have come to see as „non-rational‟” (262). Limited in our ability to 
read either Chakrabarty or Ani Pachen‟s multiple subject positions simultaneously, we too often revert to what 
he accurately terms the “untenable and problematic binaries” – which are also gendered – of 
“‟[t]radition/modernity‟, „rational/nonrational‟, „intellectual/emotion‟” (262). In this paper, I want to examine 
the ways in which a sole focus on identity, no matter how problematized, works against the political objectives 
of these Tibetan autobiographies. Sorrow Mountain, I argue, invites us to engage in a limited transnational 
feminist praxis, in the form of reading practice, to explore alternative conceptions of the subject and her agency. 
As Janet Gyatso notes in Apparitions of the Self: The Secret Autobiographies of a Tibetan Visionary: “A key 
question that readers will bring to Tibetan Buddhist autobiography is how such an eminently self-obsessed 
genre can be written by someone who believes the self to be an illusion” (xiii). In partial response to Gyatso‟s 
question, I insist on the distinction between identity and subjectivity, a distinction central both to 
poststructuralist feminist and Buddhist conceptions of selfhood. 
 
I read Sorrow Mountain for the way Chinese colonization has produced a split between subjectivity and 
identity, enabling us to see Ani Pachen‟s embodiment of Buddhist subjectivity as distinctly and variously 
modern. This split does not depend upon nostalgia for a pre-colonial, unitary, coherent subjectivity; rather, it 
becomes legible in the book as a product of colonial violence. Through tropes recognizable to audiences of 
passing familiarity with Tibet, Sorrow Mountain details Ani Pachen‟s life from girlhood as a chieftain‟s 
daughter in a mythic, pre-colonial Tibet through resistance to Chinese aggression, twenty-one years in Chinese 
prisons, and finally escape to and exile with the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala, India (she passed away in 2002 at 
the age of 68). Rather than see this narrative as a production and reflection of intrinsic Tibetan-ness, however 
seemingly authentic or fraught, I examine the ways in which Ani Pachen‟s spiritual development, through 
which she understands and articulates subjectivity, takes place through an engagement with repressive 
technologies of the modernizing Chinese state during the Maoist era (1949-1976) to Chinese liberalization 
policies and engagement with capitalism (though not democracy) during the Dengist period (1976-1996) to her 
embrace by Western forces of global marketing in the last years of her life. Tibetan Buddhism is Ani Pachen‟s 
language and mode of engagement with these forces, and if we do not separate Tibetan Buddhism – as a mode 
of understanding one‟s place in the world, a set of technologies of selfhood and of liberation from desire – from 
that of modernity, we make it available to the contemporary subject as well as restore its political agency. 
 
To do so requires an expansion of contemporary feminist and postcolonial theoretical discourses on subjectivity 
to encompass that employed by Buddhism. Through the lenses of Buddhist feminism provided by theorists such 
as Anne Carolyn Klein and Rita Gross and “out-law” autobiography suggested by Caren Kaplan, we can read 
Sorrow Mountain most productively as a contemporary colonial woman‟s autobiography that challenges 
dominant models of the genre and, thus, the subject it purportedly (re)presents. This argument might also 
contribute to the wider project of speaking with the subaltern by expanding what counts as academic theory to 
encompass other epistemologies, technologies, and enunciations of selfhood. If rationalizations of colonialism 
traditionally depend on the gendered binary oppositions cited above, crafting a discourse to suture that divide 
should recognize the religious, colonized woman as well as her collaborative text as active participants in 
discourses of modernity rather than its victims. 
 
Authenticity and Autobiography  
In her 2001 study of Anglophone Tibetan autobiographies, English in Tibet, Tibet in English, Laurie Hovell 
McMillin remarks that the majority of protagonists in (then) 30-plus such published autobiographies share 
common traits as exiles, Buddhists, and Tibetan nationalists that make them particularly appealing to Western 
readers. To achieve their often explicit goals of motivating support for Tibetan freedom from Chinese 
colonialism, these texts deploy images of “authentic” Tibetan-ness, such that, as McMillin notes, “to be worthy 
of support is another way of being authentic; to receive support is to have one‟s Tibetan-ness affirmed” (132-3). 
Non-Tibetan, Western, Anglophone consumers are ostensibly rewarded by spiritual relief from the 
dissatisfactions produced by modern materialism as well as a self-gratifying identification with an oppressed 
people. This reward depends upon a vision of Tibetan culture as spiritual, compassionate, and untouched by 
either the West or Chinese Communism (126), despite the fact that these autobiographies are predominantly 
diasporic texts, co-written by Anglophone authors, that detail the Tibetan subject‟s engagement with 
militaristic, economic, and cultural colonialism, and that circulate in the global marketplace. McMillin looks at 
claims of authenticity and attempts at subverting it, concluding that “disbanding the myth of the authentic 
Tibetan may be the only way to salvage an effective pro-Tibetan politics” (136). 
 
McMillin‟s foundational study invokes and problematizes Tibetan identity as key to understanding both the 
genre of contemporary Tibetan autobiography and its political context. At first glance, Pachen and Donnelley‟s 
Sorrow Mountain fits easily within the models of Tibetan women‟s autobiography McMillin describes. With 
seven framing devices that offer competing claims of “authenticity” according to the terms outlined above, 
Sorrow Mountain, despite its skillful and moving presentation of Ani Pachen‟s suffering at Chinese hands and 
her spirituality, may appear as (yet another) autobiographical testimonial that, while attempting to galvanize 
Tibet support, succeeds only in obviating grounds for a truly oppositional, anti-militaristic response to Chinese 
colonization or in producing “Tibet fatigue.” Alternatively, when one reads in the final “Author‟s Note” from 
Donnelley that this is “a story based on Ani Pachen‟s life” (286, original emphasis), one may dismiss it as not 
authentic enough. 
McMillin notes the “political conundrum” exacerbated by questions of authenticity implicit in diasporic Tibetan 
autobiographies: “If the situation [in Tibet] really were unlivable, then real Tibetans could not live there. Or to 
put it another way, to stay in Tibet means to compromise – or to be compromised” (125). Chinese military, 
economic, and demographic aggression becomes the necessary catalyst for the spiritual transformation of both 
the suffering, exiled Tibetan subject and the non-Tibetan Western Anglophone reader McMillin posits. Thus, 
we might see the division between identity and subjectivity I want to explore in Sorrow Mountain as a result of 
Chinese colonialism that underscores the interdependence of Ani Pachen‟s Buddhism and her experience of 
modern forces of industrialization, commodification, and colonization as well as the mobility of the subjectivity 
she embodies. 
 
Extrication from entanglements of identity politics requires a shift in the categories of analysis, beginning with 
that of the autobiography itself. The well rehearsed history of Western autobiography coincides with that of 
colonialism and privileges narratives of the individuation of a masculinized subject whose claim on the reader 
rests on narrative reliability. Turning to autobiography in a transnational context, Caren Kaplan asks how 
“Western feminist autobiography criticism” might avoid “postcolonial forms of cultural domination” as well as 
“[w]hat kind of postcolonial writing and reading strategies intersect with feminist concerns to create 
transnational feminist subjects” (Kaplan 1992, 116). While I am less interested in the creation of transnational 
feminist subjects per se than in transnational feminist reading practices and the affiliations they may engender, I 
find Kaplan‟s reconfiguration of autobiography as an “out-law genre” that privileges “a discourse of situation” 
and a “‟politics of location‟” (119) a useful framework for reading Sorrow Mountain. 
 
Kaplan defines five categories of women‟s out-law autobiography relevant to Sorrow Mountain: prison memoir, 
testimonial, ethnography, cultural autobiography, and regulative psychobiography. All address facets of the 
transnational collaborative writing process that produced the text as well as the ways in which that process 
necessitates new strategies of reading representation: prior discursive (mis)representations of the subject, 
through denunciations, legal charges, prison files, and so forth, render her already over-inscribed; the question 
of an unmediated, pre-discursive subject is moot, and the joint authorship or other forms of mediation that 
“translate” or convey the text to the reader must be read in the context of a series of discursive constructions; 
decisions of narrative style carry aesthetic and political weight and “are tied to a struggle for cultural survival” 
(130); and, the text is embedded in the “colonial and neocolonial systems, where,” Kaplan insists, “subjectivity, 
cultural power, and survival are played out in the modern era” (133). I focus my interpretation, then, not on a 
fixed definition of the culture in question (who or what is endangered), but on the formal strategies the text uses 
to mobilize support for the culture it simultaneously produces. Sorrow Mountain incorporates multiple 
discourses –Tibetan Buddhism, Tibetan history, Chinese prison discourse, international human rights discourse, 
Tibetan epic, and Western literary and cinematic tropes, among others – that collectively pose challenges for a 
singular interpretative methodology. I follow Kaplan in reading for, what Katie King calls, “‟[f]eminist writing 
technologies‟ [that] can transform cultural production from individualized and aestheticized procedures to 
collaborative, historicized, transnational coalitions” (Kaplan 135). 
 
Looking at the paratextual frames in relation to the central narrative, I show how the text as a whole deploys 
traces of political claims that, because they are conflicting, subvert the images of authenticity they deploy as 
well as, in Catherine Belsey‟s formulation, a reader‟s sense of herself as an “autonomous and knowing subject 
in a world of knowing subjects” (Belsey, 52, quoted in Chu, 13). My hope then is that a reading of Sorrow 
Mountain as out-law autobiography will engage readers with a perhaps unfamiliar conception of subjectivity 
and political agency that denaturalizes that process of subjection while enlarging postcolonial and feminist 
discourses. 
 
Identitary Claims and Paratextual Frames  
Sorrow Mountain addresses the reader with multiple frames that situate it politically, aesthetically, and 
culturally. These frames echo tropes of an idealized Tibetan defined above, but do not coalesce in a singular 
location or situation, nor do they fully contain the central narrative. Clearly marking this as a collaborative 
project, the cover attributes authorship first to Pachen and then Donnelley, an order that privileges the subject 
over the narration itself. The full title suggests suffering (sorrow mountain), transformation (the journey), and a 
twist (the warrior nun) that engage the reader in both political and spiritual endeavors, while the cover photo of 
Ani Pachen smiling against a forested, mountainous background offers some assurance that the journey has a 
happy conclusion. The cover welcomes the reader into the realm of what Graham Huggan terms the 
“postcolonial exotic”: “an aestheticizing process through which the cultural other is translated, relayed back 
through the familiar” (ix). This realm is governed by contradictory politics that may both empower the subject‟s 
self-representation and mask the effects of imperial power in producing the text (figured here as Western neo-
colonial interests in Chinese modernity as well as Western consumers‟ desire for narratives of cultural 
“otherness”) (Huggan 14). 
 
The book jacket‟s gold and red tribute to Tibetan Buddhism, as well as cover copy advertising the Foreword by 
the Dalai Lama and Preface by Richard Gere, extend the paradoxes of the cover. Opening to the jacket flap, 
overlaying a political map of Tibet on the inside cover (the mapping of the Tibet Autonomous Region remains a 
sensitive, disputed issue for Tibet supporters), we read that “this is more than a tale of war. It is also the story of 
a rich culture, the growth of a strong woman. Most significantly, it‟s a journey of spiritual empowerment.” The 
back cover reinforces the promise of an exemplary narrative of a woman‟s individuation and spirituality 
through quotes by Alice Walker, Louise Erdrich, Sharon Salzberg, Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson, and Daniel 
Goleman, all of which suggest in various ways that “[t]o read about suffering of this magnitude is ennobling” 
(Masson). Salzberg, Masson, and Goleman, who work in Buddhist and Western traditions of psychoanalysis 
and psychology, attest to its transformative potential. The presence of Erdrich and Walker may attest to its 
literary merit, although their names perhaps unwittingly detract from anti-colonial expectations of the text. For 
if Erdrich and Walker may be familiarly characterized as “ethnic” American women writers, then Pachen may 
appear as an “ethnic,” Tibetan woman writing about a pluralistic Chinese state. In sum, the quotes maintain a 
focus on internal spiritual transformation seemingly divorced from social action, thereby defining the “value of 
cultural difference” (Huggan, 13, original emphasis) according to consumers‟ desires. 
 
The Dalai Lama, perhaps more easily visible as a spiritual leader than head of the Tibet Government-in-Exile, 
offers a political endorsement of Pachen‟s story as both representative and exemplary. Calling the events 
narrated “typical of Tibet,” he further highlights “Ani Pachen‟s unflinching patriotism, her active concern for 
her fellow countrymen and –women, and her deep-seated desire to retire into solitude to pursue the spiritual life. 
It is the kind of strength she embodies that gives me grounds for optimism that ultimately the truth and justice 
of our cause will triumph” (xi-xii). Here spiritual strength becomes the catalyst for a political cause (Tibetan 
self-determination) denoted as self-evidently true and just, presumably within the discourse of international 
human rights. The effectiveness of his statement depends upon his status as at best a legitimate national leader, 
able to represent the needs and goals of his constituency, and at worst an appeal to the commodified, smiling 
promise of enlightenment who might as easily exhort one to buy Apple Computers as to protest, say, Chinese 
dumping of nuclear waste and Han Chinese population transfers into Tibet. As Peter Bishop points out, Western 
fascination with the Dalai Lama threatens to “[efface] the way that the fantasy of Shangri-La has dovetailed 
with the requirements of western global politics” (651). In the context of Pachen‟s story of resistance, 
imprisonment, and torture, the Dalai Lama speaks on behalf of a colonized people; however, Sorrow 
Mountain‟s descriptions of an idealized pre-colonial Tibet and of the Dalai Lama‟s face as “a radiant sun [that] 
has burned through the darkness” (10), regardless of how aptly it describes Pachen‟s devotion, call forth a more 
troubling popular narrative of mythic nationalism. 
 
The relationship between transnationalism, Tibetan Buddhism and nationalism so central to Sorrow Mountain 
vexes political discourse on Tibet. One may read the Dalai Lama‟s endorsement as part of a strategy, developed 
in response to a history of Western Orientalist images of Tibet as Shangri-La and pursued by the Government-
in-Exile, that plays on the stereotypical image of Tibetans whose unique compassionate spirituality and ultimate 
passivity (they want to “retire into solitude to pursue the spiritual life”) make them deserving of and non-
threatening to Western support. Such “idealized cultural politics” (Bishop 654), based upon claims of “cultural, 
religious, or environmental specialness” (Barnett, “‟Violated Specialness‟,” 275) threatens to collapse 
distinctions between Chinese and Western rationales for intervention. As Robert Barnett argues, these two 
“views of Tibet as virginal and as special mainly differ, therefore, in whether the imagined or inexperienced 
Tibet or Tibetan is recognized as a barbarian or as an innocent, as requiring civilizing or as needing protection 
and preservation” (“‟Violated Specialness‟,” 277). Both views position Tibet and Tibetans as in need of modern 
ideologies conveyed through state military, juridical, and economic apparatuses. This use of mythic nationalism 
on behalf of the Tibet cause more successfully creates “political effects by engaging people in a shared image or 
representation” than “political debate, since it does not address the political interests of other social forces” 
(“‟Violated Specialness‟” 279). 
 
In Prisoners of Shangri-La: Tibetan Buddhism and the West, Donald S. Lopez, Jr. reads this strategy as 
consistent with the explicitly political proposals put forth by the Dalai Lama in the Five-Point Peace Plan 
(1987) and Address to the European Parliament in Strasbourg (1988) – both ultimately abandoning full 
independence in favor of “internal” autonomy within a greater China – that guide present day policy. Despite 
the Dalai Lama‟s success in raising global awareness of Tibet, the affiliations engendered through this strategy 
remain constrained by the images through which they are produced. Tibetans within Tibet remain largely 
excluded, by language, social and economic viability, and access to a wide public sphere, from these political 
debates. Despite this shift in official rhetoric, Pachen vowed in political demonstrations, “As long as I‟m 
breathing, as long as I have blood running in my veins, I will never stop fighting for the independence of Tibet” 
( Tibet: Cry of the Snow Lion). On the state level, the shift in Chinese rhetoric from earlier calls to reunite the 
motherland to an ostensibly humanitarian one for “modernization” (read as economic and social progress) 
exacerbates the vacating of oppositional political will particularly among China‟s trading partners and 
forthcoming Olympic guests. 
 
Given this web of discursive constructions, it is difficult to imagine the forms that a transnational anti-colonial 
movement would take and how it would circumvent or oppose on a pragmatic level state policies driven by the 
desire to invest in or trade with China. Certainly the transnational circulation of images dependent upon mythic 
nationalism, particularly when it rarely includes the voices of resident Tibetans, makes suspect any easy 
affiliations between Tibetans-in-exile and their supporters and thus between Ani Pachen and her readers. At the 
same time, the book exceeds the narrative described above in multiple ways, making possible other forms of 
imaginative affiliation. 
 
To return to the book‟s ostensible borders, Richard Gere offers a Preface seemingly addressed specifically to 
non-Tibetan, non-Buddhist readers. Gere writes as a Tibetan Buddhist practitioner, Chair of the International 
Campaign for Tibet, recognizable American spokesperson, and primary catalyst for the publication of Ani 
Pachen‟s autobiography in this form. Yet the Preface itself calls upon tropes of Judeo-Christian religion, 
Western fairy tale and testimonial literature. Comparing Tibetan suffering under Chinese colonization to the 
Jewish Holocaust (an estimated 1.2 million Tibetans, or one-sixth of the population, were killed, imprisoned, or 
exiled during the Chinese invasion), Gere insists Tibetans‟ stories “[n]eed to be told” (read: never forget). He 
adds, “There is an old saying that God created man because He loves stories. Herein is one of His most 
extraordinary ones” (xvi). This reference to a monotheistic tradition foreign to Tibetan Buddhism has the dual 
effect of placing Ani Pachen‟s spiritual story on familiar ground for non-Buddhist readers as well as effacing 
the collaborative work of Pachen and Donnelley in favor of Gere‟s own role as intermediary between, 
presumably, the God that loves stories and Pachen herself. He notes, for example, that he recognized the lack of 
a “great Tibetan novel” which would galvanize support for the Tibet movement, and, that, having been 
introduced to Pachen as a potential subject for such a book, “I liked her immediately. That was the beginning of 
this book” (xvi). He describes the need “for a Western writer to become involved” and his “luck” in finding 
Donnelley. How we should read the narrative following the Preface, or Donnelley‟s contribution itself, becomes 
increasingly ambiguous. Gere describes Pachen as a “princess” whose story is “wildly fantastic,” though “not 
unique” (xv) and praises the “storybook simplicity” of Donnelley‟s writing, concluding: “Her writing is a 
miracle of truth” (xvi). He has, finally, fostered the emergence of this truth for broad secular and spiritual ends: 
“May this book help to dispel the darkness of this darkest night of Tibetan history and be of benefit to all beings 
everywhere. May the hearts of our Chinese brothers and sisters be opened and may they quickly come to their 
senses” (xvii). Even as the Preface collapses boundaries between novel and autobiography in potentially 
productive ways, it reaffirms the implicit and problematic connection between the reader‟s potential spiritual 
transformation and (therefore) political efficacy, and it does so through the elision of collaborative writing 
process itself. The erasure of the women‟s collaboration as political work (he says Donnelley “soon became 
Ani-la‟s friend, confidante, and co-conspirator” (xvi), a description that characterizes their political activism 
and authorship as adolescent) in favor of his own patronage, however laudable, reinforces a gendered 
representation of “traditional” Tibet and Tibetans in need of modern and masculine Western intervention. 
 
While both the Foreword and Preface present Pachen‟s story as simultaneously exemplary (in its spirituality) 
and representative (in its suffering), significantly what appears “wildly fantastic” to Gere is merely “typical” to 
the Dalai Lama. Yet both insist on its status as truth, a claim to which I return below and one which creates a 
peculiar set of expectations for what follows. The next “introduction” to Pachen‟s own story appears after the 
title page, but without its own heading. Written in mythic voice and presented in italics, it draws on the national 
oral epic of King Gesar (the longest known national epic, and one traditionally told over days and weeks by 
itinerant bards, although there are also multiple written versions) to present a common history of Tibet:  
In the ancient time of King Gesar, Tibet was a place of the gods. But during the reign of the Fifth Dalai Lama, 
the area stretching from the western region known for its nutmeg trees to the eastern region known for its 
brocade was brought under the administration of the Tibetan government. Since that time, a succession of lay 
and monk district officials carried out the land‟s administration in accordance with the Buddhist principles of 
compassion and justice. (xxi) 
 
Once again linking national and religious concerns, this opening paragraph connects Tibet‟s territorial 
enlargement during the reign of the Fifth Dalai Lama with Tibetan Buddhism as a benevolent political force that 
incorporated many of the traditions and gods of the earlier Bon religion. The appropriation of the epic offers a 
longer, albeit mythologized, national history that again underscores the uniqueness of the culture. The inclusion 
of King Gesar similarly destabilizes the expectations of the reader by moving from a “true” story vouched for 
by the Dalai Lama and Gere to a mythic one. 
 
The multiple forms of the epic of King Gesar legitimize its appearance in the book, while positioning Sorrow 
Mountain as at once an example of protest literature and “ethnic” literary fiction. In the first instance, we can 
read the inclusion of King Gesar within an evolution of contemporary Tibetan secular culture. Samten G. 
Karmey, for instance, analyzes current circulations of the epic of King Gesar within Tibet for the ways in which 
it, coming from outside of monastic tradition and especially given Chinese suppression of that tradition, 
constructs a more viable national identity than traditional religious narratives (114). Increasing popularity of 
various forms of the epic, much like the genre of contemporary Tibetan autobiography, reflects a national 
culture evolving in response and resistance to Chinese domination. Both genres also develop through a complex 
process of translation between oral and written discourses, and I address below the specific conditions of that 
process in producing Sorrow Mountain. 
 
If we read the inclusion of King Gesar alternatively as a mark of ethnic literature within a global literary 
marketplace, then the value of its cultural difference (from a hypothetical Western reader‟s culture(s) as well as 
from its “local” forms) again faces competing claims. The debate within Asian American literature between 
Frank Chin and Maxine Hong Kingston over who may represent Chinese classics to a Western audience and in 
what form offers a stark, more familiar example of these claims. While Pachen and Donnelley‟s invocation of 
King Gesar within Sorrow Mountain, like Kingston‟s use of Chinese heroic texts in Tripmaster Monkey, favors 
“an interactive reading strategy that emphasizes the texts‟ collaboration with various communities of readers” 
(Chu, 171), as opposed to one that fixes cultural difference through reference to a single, authoritative text, it 
unwittingly reproduces the gendered terms of the Chin/Kingston debate. In Sorrow Mountain, the potential 
political benefits of the text as a collaborative, Buddhist feminist out-law autobiography must emerge through 
the conflict between material patronage and political truth claims offered by the Dalai Lama and Gere and 
testaments to the merit of literary cultural difference offered by Walker and Erdich. 
 
At the same time, because King Gesar stands liminally between the paratextual frames and central narrative 
(Ani Pachen‟s own, short rendering of her life story also includes a reference to the epic), it problematizes the 
idea of a singular narrative voice while providing a heroic model the story that follows presumably will seek to 
appropriate in sly ways. King Gesar is both an elected king and “the personification of the ideal Tibetan man, 
that is to say a man who can perform super-natural feats when engaged in battle,” who otherwise prefers a life 
of meditation (Karmey 114). His story establishes a model of anti-colonial national heroism that resonates 
politically and religiously, heroically and selflessly. The epic songs coalesce around the “conflict between the 
protective and morally just powers of Buddhism and the destructive and demonic power of egoism in its various 
forms” (Samuel 363). The decision to include King Gesar alerts readers both to a tradition of Buddhist 
nationalism and of the heroic Buddhist pursuit of “non-self” ( anātman) which here overlaps with an 
egolessness that remains politically engaged. We are asked then to turn our attention to what such a model of 
subjectivity entails. 
 
Subverting the Postcolonial Exotic – The Central Narrative  
We first hear Pachen‟s voice in her Prologue, which weaves biographical data (“My name is Lemdha Pachen,” 
“I was born in 1933”), mythic nationalism (“My country was once at the roof of the world, a place where the 
great spirits lived”), collective suffering (“Now the forests are gone, the animals killed, and the great teachings 
scattered to the winds”), individual suffering (“There are days when my stomach aches from the long years in 
prison”), and spiritual renewal (“My prayers are answered, I am blessed”). The Prologue continues the narrative 
begun on the front and back cover of the ideal Tibetan as an exiled, Buddhist nationalist who, through her own 
suffering, offers a model of spiritual strength for others. That “I” appearing at last in chapter one, however, 
offers a much more complicated representation of her own critically conscious, Buddhist praxis. Her spirituality 
does not denote the beliefs adopted, held, or deepened by an already-existent subject; rather, they are mutually 
constitutive. Through representations of what we might, for argument‟s sake, separate as her spiritual beliefs, 
we witness the reflective or critical development of her subjectivity. The process and praxis of subjectivity, 
then, becomes as important as the individuations it assumes in given contexts. 
 
Chapter one begins with the memory, in present tense, of footsteps approaching her prison cell, then the torture 
room and her hands being tied behind her back: “They hoist me up by my wrists. Once again flame shoots 
through my shoulder, bile fills my mouth. I swing, senseless, and the room fades into darkness” (3). The 
narrative emerges out of that darkness and moves in the metonymic, fragmentary way of dreams through 
waiting to meet the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala, childhood memories, Buddhist teachings, old friends, to a final 
injunction to tell her story: “‟ You have seen Tibet‟s tragedy,‟ [the Dalai Lama] once said. „ You have lived its 
suffering. You must tell your story so others will know'" (10, original emphasis). This progression establishes 
an expectation of witnessing, of narrative truth that speaks to the darkness and silencing of torture, even though 
the discursive images through which it is conveyed are overtly novelistic and cinematic: “In a darkened corner 
of my mind [paralleling both the memory of the prison cell and then the small nun‟s quarters in which she 
awakes and now lives], a small patch of green appears. I watch it grow brighter, larger, until a vast green 
meadow stretches out at my feet” (4). 
 
This combination of truth claims and a novelistic style troubles many reviewers. Mark Zimmerman calls Sorrow 
Mountain the latest in a series of Third World women‟s stories of political oppression that are located at “a 
messy and paradoxical confluence of personal integrity, multiculturalist politics, capitalist media, and 
postcolonial ideology.” He credits Donnelley for her use of flashbacks, dreams, and interior monologues that 
have their “own stylistic weight”; yet, he concludes that Donnelley‟s ambiguity in the Author‟s Note about the 
status of the text as “as much narrative as strict biography” ( Sorrow Mountain, 286) “throws the veracity of the 
entire book into question, at least for those who are after something greater than unsubstantiated exploits” 
(Zimmerman, 15). John Crook in the London Times Literary Supplement, comments at the end of an otherwise 
favorable review, “We are invariably left wondering how far the political intent of this work may have 
remoulded actual history,” and suggests a trip to the Tibetan archives in Dharamsala for the curious (6). Though 
the details of these criticisms seem overstated (can survival of twenty-one years of imprisonment and forced 
labor be called an exploit? is there reason to doubt the kind of data one might verify in the archives?), the 
premise of their arguments rests on the familiar, if out-moded conflation of autobiography with empiricism. 
More productively, we might follow Kaplan‟s advice to read the novelistic elements as part of the overall 
strategy of conveying to Western readers an anti-colonial message and as one of several means of conveying the 
constructions of identity rather than as indicators or reflections of Pachen‟s “true” self. Pachen and/or 
Donnelley‟s use of such generative language (literary, poetic, rhetorical) which privileges metaphor and other 
figurative devices also corresponds to this tradition in Buddhist scriptural literature as a technique underscoring 
the making rather than finding of meaning. 
 
My own attempt to understand the book‟s “narrative invention” (Kaplan) began when I taught it in a 
Contemporary (Post)Colonial Women Writers class at the George Washington University. Although I do not 
know Donnelley personally, I asked her through e-mail for greater insight into the collaboration, and she 
generously responded with a detailed description of the interview process as well as excerpts from Pachen‟s 
initial 15-21 page written record of her life (crafted in exile at the prompting of the Government-in-Exile) that 
formed the foundation for the questions Donnelley posed. Pachen‟s account features primarily the names and 
lineages of fellow prisoners who did not survive. That account became the basis for Donnelley‟s long interview 
process, mediated by a translator whose regional dialect differed from Pachen‟s, to draw out the subject of the 
autobiography. Sorrow Mountain functions as a palimpsest of these articulations, beginning with a subject who 
wishes to speak as a representative witness rather than individual, and constitutes an evolving Tibetan cultural 
form constructed in exile. 
 
According to Donnelley, she, Gere, and Pachen agreed on the goal of the book: to produce a “good read” that 
would “reach beyond those who already knew and supported Tibet – beyond those who were interested in 
Tibetan Buddhism” to broaden understanding of the situation in Tibet and, specifically, to “raise money for the 
Tibet cause.” Despite these common goals, establishing the storyline necessitated a laborious (on both women‟s 
parts) process of daily translation over three months in India and six months at Donnelley‟s home in California. 
The collaborative process of constructing that narrative, requiring international airfares, a book contract, 
translators, living expenses, and so forth, took place within a system of patronage that, McMillin persuasively 
argues, reifies images of the authentic Tibetan (132). In contrast to that reinforcement of the 
protagonist/subject‟s identity, she notes the various identificatory positions the reader may take up in relation to 
the “I” of the text, movements that both enable and subvert the kinds of spiritual transformations promised the 
reader by the text‟s various frames. In either case, the reader‟s multiple subject positions themselves “[become] 
a kind of resistance of notions of essential selfhood” (135). The multi-faceted process of translation itself 
encourages that resistance by deconstructing the authority of any ostensibly originary text. 
 
Donnelley highlights four categories of difficulties: literal and cultural translation, filling in where Pachen‟s 
memory failed, providing historical context without sacrificing narrative flow, and providing insight into 
Tibetan Buddhism. Donnelley describes the process of translation during the interviews as “like the game of 
telephone,” in that after she posed and re-posed her question to ensure the translator understood it, the translator 
repeated that process in asking Pachen the question, confirming the answer (especially difficult given their 
different dialects), and then translating it back to Donnelley, for whom “often…the answer had no bearing on 
what I had asked.” As an example of the cultural differences that needed bridging, she provides the following: 
“‟How did you feel about your father‟ – „He was tall‟ „Were you close to him?‟ – „He was loved by his people‟ 
„What did he look like?‟ – „He was tall‟ „You say your father treated you like a boy, what did he do?‟ – „I was 
his son and his daughter.‟” Such examples do not invalidate the narrative. The painstaking dialogic process here 
is defined by the desire to have one‟s position understood by the other, and thus through the shared process of 
making meaning. Although I, too, am beholden to the translations that have come before, by comparing brief 
passages of Pachen‟s record with Sorrow Mountain, we see Donnelley‟s close attention to conveying Pachen‟s 
“voice.” The final text, she writes, had “to be both true to the musical quality and rhythm of Ani la‟s actual way 
of speaking and at the same time read in a way that was culturally familiar to the western ear” (this was 
enhanced by writing down the translator‟s English as well as having another translator provide a transcription of 
Pachen‟s Tibetan). For instance, while Pachen describes being given tea as she awaits her audience with the 
Dalai Lama as, “For me this was pure nectar and I felt that my body speech and mind had been purified,” 
Donnelley writes: “The tea was fragrant and sweet, like nectar. As its warm liquid flowed down my throat, I felt 
as though my body were being purified and my mind began to clear” (277). Although Donnelley‟s strategy 
adheres to codes of the postcolonial exotic defined above, the correspondence of Pachen and Donnelley‟s tones 
cautions us against reading what is seemingly novelistic, descriptive, or emotive as explicitly Western. Within 
the frame of Huggan‟s postcoloniality (the globalized conditions of the literary marketplace), this passage 
domesticates the unfamiliar (the political import of telling the Dalai Lama about decades of imprisonment 
attributable in part to loyalty to him superceded by the comfort of a cup of tea); yet, it hints at the continued 
possibility of colonial resistance (how might joining of mind and body in a sense of clarity be empowering or 
agenic and to what ends?). The textual correspondences do not confirm an authentic self so much as mobilize 
the narrative in multiple ways that attest to and exceed the terms of the patronage that enables it. That 
mobilization continued when the book was translated into Tibetan and broadcast into Tibet by Radio Free Asia. 
 
Despite Ani Pachen‟s earlier characterization as a “warrior princess,” her “heroism,” like that of King Gesar, 
emerges between the narrative “I” and a Buddhist sense of “non-self,” a space which is also, like that 
constructed in other testimonios, necessarily collective as well as individual. The story continually shifts 
between the singular and the plural. In one of several references to the title, for example, Pachen tells of her 
pilgrimage to Mount Kailash, where she will, after circumambulating the mountain, launch her escape to India. 
As her party first glimpses the sacred mountain, “it felt like we were entering a timeless place, approaching the 
center of the universe.” Nearing the peak, however, the spiritual renewal it promises is replaced by a feeling of 
sadness: “I thought that if all the sorrows we had suffered the last thirty years could be put on top of one 
another, that is how tall they would be.” Finally, she hears her father‟s voice and sees her mother‟s hand 
reaching toward her; “I saw Dekyong [her closest spiritual companion] walking away, a soldier behind her. 
Sorrow upon sorrow…” (270). In these passages, the “we” of the pilgrimage party becomes a national “we” of 
suffering before perspective slides back to the familial. Such kaleidoscopic shifts destabilize easy associations 
between subject and reader since the subject itself, and thus the potential affiliations it engenders, is continually 
reconstructed. 
 
Reading the “heroic” subject is most problematic in relation to Pachen‟s actions in resisting the Chinese. 
Whereas the title and cover photo suggest a positive resolution to the paradoxical identity of the “warrior nun,” 
the text evades directly addressing that paradox. The written text does not acknowledge that she wears the 
traditional chupa, rather than nun‟s robes, in the cover photo (as well as in the photo of both Pachen and 
Donnelley on the back flap). In The Tibetans: A Struggle to Survive, photographer Steve Lehman includes 
Pachen in his section on former political prisoners. The caption under her sober portrait reads, in part: 
“Currently, Ani Panchen [sic] practices as a nun, she does not wear robes because she has killed people.” This 
will come as a surprise to anyone who knows Pachen solely through Sorrow Mountain. What might have stood 
as the central conflict in the book, the impact on the individual‟s development of her attempt to reconcile 
Buddhist precepts of nonviolence with military struggle and even killing, is suggested in the paradoxical title, 
though elided in the story itself. 
 
As Chinese aggression grows in Kham, Ani Pachen‟s father dies and she reluctantly assumes his political role 
as chieftain, organizing with other local leaders resistance to the Chinese. Her father‟s death marks her 
transition from childhood to adulthood: “In a moment, I knew that my dream of a life devoted to meditation and 
prayer was no longer possible. Unable to follow my heart, I was bound by duty to carry on my father‟s work. 
With my country threatened and my family in danger, I set about making preparations for war” (123). What 
initially appears as a conflict between heart and duty, prayer and war, is reconciled for her by a lama who 
encourages her to fight to ensure “the survival of the teachings.” At that point, she feels a “new sense of 
purpose,” vowing, “If I can contribute something to protecting the great teachings of Buddha […], I will do 
whatever is asked. Even kill” (128). Although this slippage from political and familial to religious duty 
corresponds to the vision of Tibetans as invariably Buddhist, it takes place through a curious evasion of 
individual agency. One wonders, for instance, given Pachen‟s role as a resistance leader, who will do the 
asking. 
The following year, 1959, the situation further deteriorates, and with Tibetan troops losing battles and the 
Chinese army a day‟s march away, Pachen‟s household joins others in fleeing to the hills. The first time 
Chinese troops attack, she fires the gun she inherited from her father, recites the Buddhist mantra Om Mani 
Peme Hum, and is relieved to discover “[n]o one was killed” (143). A couple of days later, after escaping 
another Chinese attack that killed many in her party, she reunites with Dekyong, whom she has greatly missed 
from earlier days in the monastery. Both agree that the current situation necessitates their violent contribution, 
understood once again through the conflation of nation and religion: “‟Everyone has to fight until Tibet 
becomes free again,‟ Dekyong said sadly, „to protect Buddha‟s teachings‟” (148). A new Chinese attack tests 
this resolve, and here again Pachen‟s action is sublimated to Dekyong‟s and ultimately ineffective. As five 
soldiers approach and both women draw their pistols, Pachen “nod[s] at Dekyong to go first.” “Dekyong‟s 
pistol sent one, two, three, four bullets down to the road” and “two men fell,” then Pachen says, “I shot, but the 
bullets fell short “(149). The two women quickly mount their horses and rejoin the rest of the group. Weeks of 
hardship in the hills follow, they are forced to head in different directions, and Pachen‟s responsibility turns to 
caring for her mother and grandmother as they trek over 6,000 meter passes in the snow toward India. In her 
final encounter with Chinese troops, moments before they arrest her group, she sees soldiers approaching on all 
sides and tries quickly to bury her pistol in the snow. 
 
I dispute neither the rationale for taking up defensive arms here, nor Pachen‟s desire to avoid killing; however, I 
am interested in the ways in which the narrative displaces the question of what it means for her to (be willing 
to) kill. Rather than the crux of the individual‟s psychic organization or political or spiritual development, it 
appears as a philosophical argument materialized and resolved through the actions of another (or more 
circuitously, her pistol). The sympathetic portrayal of Dekyong, as Pachen‟s spiritual companion, offers a 
justification for killing that simultaneously releases reader and author(s) from having to reconcile the opposing 
narratives of the “warrior nun” into a singular narrative of the heroine, though it does represent an argument for 
collective resistance. While I, too, have raised the question of historical record, I maintain that the book‟s 
silence on the question of whether or not Ani Pachen has killed people (an identitary question in terms of the 
photographs), especially when combined with the multiple subject positions created throughout the text for both 
the narrative “I” and the reader, redirects our attention to problem of subjectivity itself. 
 
A Strategic Invocation of Buddhist Feminism  
For Chakrabarty, reuniting affect and reason, and thereby refiguring modernity to account for religious belief, 
necessitates a poststructuralist reading of subjectivity to “move away from the monomania of the imagination 
that operates within the gesture that the knowing, judging, willing subject always already knows what is good 
for everybody.” Its goal is to resist the imperial fantasy to know and control the other: to develop “the capacity 
to hear that which one does not already understand” (275), without attempting to wholly assimilate it. In this 
final section I want to bring together my desire for anti-imperialist readings of Sorrow Mountain in terms of 
both valuing, without coopting, the subjectivity produced by the text as well as recognizing its potential for 
activating anti-colonial politics (or in terms of both postcoloniality and postcolonialism (Huggan)). Rita Gross 
and Anne Carolyn Klein bridge Buddhist and poststructuralist conceptions of inessential subjectivity, both from 
feminist perspectives, in ways productive for this argument. Insisting that both traditions share an understanding 
of subjectivity as constructed and socially mediated, Gross and Klein provide Buddhist feminist vocabulary for 
interpreting the subject and her agency for those of us trained primarily in contemporary Western theory. 
 
From a Buddhist perspective, according to Gross, we might understand constructedness as interdependent co-
arising, the understanding that “nothing exists independent of its matrix, but only in interdependence with it” ( 
BAP, 159). While self and other are mutually defining, they need not be fundamentally oppositional; rather, the 
“‟other‟ is not really extrinisic to „self‟ but the raw material that confirms and constitutes self” (SS, 27). 
Because not just our epistemologies are situated, but their objects are as well, Buddhists refer to the “emptiness 
of inherent existence”: things “do not exist in and of themselves, but only relative to their matrix, dependent on 
causes and conditions” ( BAP, 174). What we recognize as self, then, Gross describes as “any style of habitual 
patterns and responses that clouds over the clarity and openness of basic human nature” ( BAP, 162). This 
“basic human nature” is not, itself, essential in a conventional sense, but the capacity humans have to recognize 
the condition of emptiness defined above. Buddhist practice, in other words, takes place through the cultivation 
of a critical consciousness capable of reflecting on its own work. Self meanwhile most easily appears through 
the “styles of ego” we create ( BAP, 158), or what we might loosely call identity. 
 
In order to move beyond identity in a Western sense to understand better the nature of subjectivity itself, Klein 
emphasizes the cultivation of awareness and mindfulness. She defines awareness as a “non-oppositional mental 
posture that is at the same time self-empowering” (“Finding,” 196). Awareness arises from close, 
nonjudgmental observation of how one negotiates one‟s own existence. By focusing particularly on strong 
emotions, one gains a clearer understanding of the workings of the self, of what Buddhists call inherent 
existence which corresponds to the deepest operations of a Western sense of identity: “It is precisely when 
strong feelings arise – for example, when one is defending against an unjust accusation, in a state of fright or 
exultation – that one can detect the self that one will defend, rescue, or to which one will give pleasure” 
(“Finding,” 200). By observing the self at a distance, as it were, without either condemning or idealizing it, one 
learns to recognize its inherent emptiness and, thus, its mutuality with the other. This recognition, Klein 
suggests, works against oppression and on behalf of compassion as “[t]he unthinking attribution of status to 
others, and the appropriation of it for oneself, is considered by Buddhists to be the lived ontology that underpins 
all oppression” (“Finding,” 201). 
 
From awareness, one may deepen one‟s inquiry into subjectivity through mindfulness: “the ability to retain 
clear and stable attention on a chosen object” (“Presence”). The goal of mindfulness as a practice is to “develop 
new subjective states and to discover hitherto unnoticed aspects of oneself” ( MGBQ, 62), both of which clarify 
the constructed nature of self and, thus, one‟s mutuality with and necessary compassion for others. In other 
words, mindfulness, although ostensibly directed inward, incorporates social agency. As Klein summarizes, 
“mindfulness, and the mental focus that develops from it, is described as a unifying dynamic and seen as 
lending coherence to the subject even as it reveals the endless flux of self and world. Put another way, 
mindfulness and the dimensions of concentration related to it simultaneously demonstrate the self‟s 
constructedness and its fully viable agency” (“Presence”). Unlike Western theories of inessentialism that 
privilege discursive constructions of the “real,” mindfulness and awareness, with their focus on posture, breath, 
and observation, do not recognize the mind/body duality girding Western subjectivity, encompassing instead the 
intuitive, visceral, and mental knowledges and experiences the subject accumulates (including discursive 
constructions). Klein emphasizes that because mindfulness and awareness are understood as embodied, they 
work with Western feminisms in validating alternative forms of knowledge and experience as opposed to a 
singular definition of knowledge tied to a disembodied, yet masculinized reason (“Presence”). Perhaps most 
significantly in differentiating Western feminist from Buddhist conceptions of subjectivity, Buddhist 
recognition of an expanded realm of embodied subjectivity is directed not at epistemological accumulation 
(defining the subject by what she knows), but ontological process (how she knows or the state of that knowing). 
 
As a practice or method of inquiry, Buddhist subjectivity responds to the problem of narrating, representing, 
and conversing with the subaltern, particularly the subaltern female, in innovative ways for Western feminism 
and postcolonial theory; it opens another path for transnational feminist affiliation alongside, just to name a 
very few, those established on grounds of common struggles against forces of “racism, sexism, colonialism, 
imperialism, and monopoly capitalism” (Mohanty, 46); “the politics of location” (Kaplan 1994, 137); 
postmodern, diasporic identities (Grewal); and, unlearning class privilege combined with deep language 
learning and deconstructionist reading practices (Spivak). Buddhist feminism provides a language for 
recognizing and valuing mindfulness of human experience ranging from the most overtly embodied (physical 
pain) to intellectualism to mysticism. As such it contributes to transnational feminisms a non-universalizing 
inquiry into sentience that traverses the binary oppositions often foundational to lived oppressions. It gives us a 
language of affiliation that, in focusing on the process and effects of perception -- rather than on a shared 
material or geographic locations or identitary claims -- does not attend to divisions between mind and body, 
tradition and modernity, the non-rational and rational. As do other transnational feminist theorists, Klein and 
Gross insist on the worldliness of this practice. Whereas Gross defines the subject‟s goal of enlightenment as 
freedom in rather than from the world ( BAP, 146), Klein argues, “The ability to connect one‟s cultivation of 
insight, calming, or compassion with an embodied awareness is…a crucial element in ensuring that one‟s 
insights – Buddhist or non-Buddhist, contemplative or administrative – are, in fact, concretely directed at the 
well-being of other embodied beings” (“Buddhist Understandings,” 24). Thus, I want to ask in conclusion how 
might we connect a Buddhism-informed reading of subjectivity in Sorrow Mountain with its overt political 
goals, or more simply how we might incorporate mindfulness into our reading practice. 
 
Because of the “need to include among our categories of subjectivity a dimension of mind that is not primarily 
linguistic or conceptual, and yet…is capable of being cultivated, and therefore is to be included among „higher 
order‟ and „cultural‟ human activities” (“Presence”), it follows that conventional patterns of narrative will not 
suffice in representing that subjectivity. Arguing for “narrative strategies that literally incorporate that embodied 
state,” Klein also suggests that “[m]ythic dimensions, syllogistic logic, and an epic sense of history are matrixes 
in and through which Authenticity emerges,” matrixes that, in a Tibetan Buddhist worldview, include the 
fantastic (“Buddhist Understandings,” 26, 31-2, original emphasis). Sorrow Mountain provides us with close 
descriptions of Pachen‟s cultivation of her own awareness and mindfulness practice, particularly when she faces 
strong emotion, within multiple narrative modes of fiction, autobiography, and epic. Examination of these 
passages will not tell us “who she is” – a desire for knowledge that can only, given the political and material 
conditions out of which the text arises, be colonizing; it may, however, provide insight into how the text 
deploys culturally constructed subjectivity with libratory political ramifications. 
 
Klein suggests that the process of understanding subjectivity begins with adulthood, and the central narrative 
opens by counterposing Pachen‟s awaiting torture while in prison against awaiting the Dalai Lama in exile. 
These two experiences come together as Pachen glances in the mirror on her way to greet the Dalai Lama. She 
contrasts self-recognition (“I see a parched landscape…I pull the skin taut at the corners of my eyes and squint, 
trying to see some sign of the face that was once there”) with the idealizing glance bestowed by foreigners she 
meets: “The foreigners bring me pictures. „There!‟ they say. „Aren‟t you beautiful!‟” (6). Klein writes that 
mindfulness may “suggest ways to avoid treating the self as a territory to be conquered, governed, or colonized 
by ideals” (“Presence”), and Pachen turns to embodied knowledge – “I feel a heat rising in my chest,” “My 
mind softens, but the heat in my chest remains” (6-7) – as she acknowledges the appropriative foreign glance 
and attempts to move beyond it: “My beauty has faded, my youth has gone. But I‟m free” (7). Freedom 
resonates in several ways in this passage, referring at once to her ability to lock the door behind her as she 
leaves her small room in Dharamsala, to know herself outside of the idealizing view of the foreigners who wish 
to meet and photograph her, and to exercise critical awareness in shifting from the “heat rising” to her mind 
softening in response to their patronizing gaze. 
 
When the book follows more closely a chronological narrative, though one continually interrupted by dreams, 
memories, and Buddhist teachings in ways that underscore its own construction, it reveals the development of 
mindfulness from its tentative and sporadic beginnings in girlhood to its cultivation through advanced practices 
toward the end of her life. As a seventeen-year-old girl, suffering initially appears to Pachen in familial, 
gendered terms. She watches her mother age and bow under the strain of running a chieftain‟s household, while 
she recognizes “a pull…a sliver of feeling, a sensation too fleeting to voice” (20) of her spiritual calling. 
Learning that her father has, without consulting her, arranged a politically advantageous marriage for her, she 
forces a servant to assist her in running way. Her refusal to conform to the gendered and class norms expected 
of her is simultaneously bold and immature. Once her father sends additional servants to convey his promise to 
nullify the marriage contract, she returns home in “embarrassment, anger and relief” and senses her body 
stiffening (37). Focusing her mind on the words of her teacher about “right speech” (speaking without anger or 
lies), she comments, “The words began to fade, and for a moment my mind was free of thoughts and feelings. 
My anger slowly dissolved. I felt myself softening” (37-8). She experiences similar regret after whipping one of 
her father‟s aides who initially refuses to acknowledge her local authority upon her father‟s death. In both cases, 
assertion of her will in gendered terms brings her only additional suffering (though it also achieves its aims), 
and she ultimately rejects that style of selfhood (which we might label “hard”) in favor of accepting her familial 
duties and cultivating mindfulness. Through the latter, developed particularly in response to the hardships of 
imprisonment and torture and advanced Buddhist practices, she emerges most explicitly as a Tibetan Buddhist 
heroine, as her advanced practices distinguish her even among Tibetan Buddhist nuns. 
 
In The Body in Pain, Elaine Scarry effectively argues that torture works to silence and to erase the subject 
through physical pain that “does not simply resist language but actively destroys it” (4). The subject may 
attempt to (re)create herself through a narrative of pain, though “the verbal strategies for overcoming that 
assault are very small in number and reappear consistently as one looks at the words of patient, physician, 
Amnesty worker, lawyer, artist: these verbal strategies revolve around the verbal sign of the weapon or what 
will eventually be called here the language of „agency‟” (13). Sorrow Mountain may be read as a form of 
individual and collective “self”-creation to resist the obliterating forces of torture; yet, as Scarry notes, the 
language of agency she describes always carries with it ambiguity: “for the person in pain, so incontestably and 
unnegotiably present is it that „having pain‟ may come to be thought of as the most vibrant example of what it is 
to „have certainty,‟ while for the other person it is so elusive that „hearing about pain‟ may exist as the primary 
model of what it is „to have doubt.‟ Thus pain comes unsharably into our midst as at once that which cannot be 
denied and that which cannot be confirmed” (4). The “unsharability” of pain rests at the center of debates over 
the status of Sorrow Mountain and other such testimonials and witnessing of violent political oppression. If 
“unsharability” results in part from the failure of narrative (or of language in general, as a social construction) to 
convey the “presence” of pain to those absent from it, then the reader remains continually caught between a 
voyeuristic desire to “know” another‟s pain and doubt about its “true” nature. The Buddhist doctrine of non-self 
further complicates the issue of representation: how can an ultimately illusory self both know and represent 
“having pain” (“having certainty”)? 
 
The language of mindfulness offers a potentially productive perspective on this conundrum, as it conveys a 
deep sense of presence without reifying the self. However, the narrative at once acknowledges mindfulness, yet 
refuses to countenance full embodied “knowing” during these passages. Descriptions of Pachen‟s girlhood in 
pre-colonial Tibet are suffused with mythic, romantic, and metaphoric literary discourse. As the story shifts to 
her imprisonment, however, the discourse itself becomes sparer. Passages concerning torture include brief 
descriptions of the physical actions such as “they hit my face with a board” (169) or “[a]s they beat me I jerked 
to the side so forcefully I often hit their legs with my head” (184) and sometimes, though not always, the 
accompanying physical sensations (“[p]ain like a burning iron shot through my shoulders” (169)). In each 
instance, Pachen insists on the separation of the physical experiences she cannot control and the mental ones 
that she can both observe and try to shape. In a typical passage, describing her first experience with sustained 
torture when she was imprisoned with her mother and aunt, she says: 
 
After a while I no longer felt anxiety when I heard the steps on the walk, no longer cared what they did. At 
times I saw my body lying on the floor, but my spirit was somewhere else. 
 
In the moments I was able to think, I thought of the terrible karma I must have had in a previous life to be 
beaten like that, and prayed that the pain I was feeling would eliminate all sins that had been built up. (170) 
By gesturing toward a language of mindfulness here, while insisting on the necessity of withdrawing from 
representation, of maintaining strategic separation of body and “spirit,” the text denies the reader‟s desire to 
know another‟s pain. At the same time, the description ascribes agency to Pachen that, because it is so limited, 
as when she mentions “the moments I was able to think,” posits her critical consciousness as the antithesis to an 
omnipotent, destructive pain. “Having certainty,” then, comes from mindfulness rather than the representation 
of pain for another. If, in Scarry‟s terms, the book as artifact is “a projection of the human body” that as such 
reconstitutes the subject and the world out of the obliterating forces of torture (281), then it functions most 
effectively when it follows “the structure of a perception” (289, original emphasis). The example above focuses 
attention on how Pachen perceives pain rather than on precisely what that unsharable pain “is,” making the 
inanimate book the site of mindfulness and the “awareness of aliveness” (289). For Scarry, Klein, and Pachen, 
embedded in such mindfulness and awareness is compassion. 
 
The restraint governing the portrayal of physical torture enables limited identification not solely dictated by 
exoticism. Neither fully described nor completely defamiliarized, the torture passages ask the reader to become 
conscious of the ways in which she is reading and the stakes of that reading: does one read from a particular 
religious vantage point, one defined by community, or perhaps one attributed to a universalist view of human 
rights? In my experience teaching the text, the various ways in which readers answer this question bring 
analysis back to both the production of the text and its stated goals, thus underscoring the constructions 
themselves. Compassion, then, does not arise from full identification (a process that can only be cooptive given 
the material distance between Pachen and her readers) with a knowable subject or her pain, but from the text‟s 
ability to activate imagination to recreate the subject perceiving pain. 
 
Although Pachen remarks that she feels no fear when she hears the prison guards approach, it is only after her 
release from prison, when she has the opportunity to pursue more fully her spiritual training, that she learns to 
conquer fear through the esoteric Chod practice of cutting through attachment and surviving on essence. 
Pachen‟s experience with Chod receives lengthy and distinct treatment toward the end of the book. Matching 
neither the romanticization of the opening chapters, nor the restraint of the prison sections, it appears in 
explicitly Buddhist language that emphasizes mindfulness practice within its more mystical context, yet remains 
grounded politically. Establishing the parameters of colonial degradation, upon her release from prison Pachen 
returns to her village to witness the tremendous suffering of ordinary Tibetans over more than two decades of 
Chinese colonization. She visits Lhasa and then proceeds on a long pilgrimage to witness the destruction of 
various great monasteries of pre-colonial Tibet, working to rebuild one before beginning an eight-month retreat 
in a mountain cave. There she meets an 84-year old hermit, Amdo Jetsun, who becomes her teacher and 
introduces her to Chod practice. The narrative makes little attempt to bridge the cultural divide between 
advanced Tibetan Buddhist practitioners and the “typical” Western readers I have been positing, as Pachen 
relates, “I existed in a state of abiding calm,” Amdo Jetsun “taught me to exist on a spoonful of finely ground 
rock boiled in water, twice a day” (254), and most dramatically, “we performed a Chod practice, visualizing our 
bodies being cut and offered to the demons” (257). The test of her practice comes that night as the rising river 
threatens to drown them as they sleep in a burial ground, and Amdo Jetsun encourages her not to flee. The 
section on Chod concludes as Amdo Jetsun tells her: “Fear…is often an illusion formed by thoughts in our 
mind,” and urges her not to allow either physical or psychological “obstructions” to break her meditation (285). 
Pachen concludes, “I never felt fear again in quite the same way” (258). From there the narrative follows her 
briefly to Lhasa where she helps organize the 1987 demonstrations and then into exile. The representation of 
cultivating advanced states of subjectivity takes place in fantastic, seemingly esoteric language. It conforms to 
the reader‟s desire to gaze upon a rarefied world, yet does so in terms that emphasize one‟s distance from it; it 
refuses the return through the familiar. One wonders, for instance, how many of Donnelley‟s target audience 
will wish either to visualize the flesh being peeled from their limbs or to financially support the Tibet movement 
because of reading this section.  
 
At the same time, the framing of the Chod section with political awareness and activism indicates how cutting 
worldly attachments and conquering fears of death may underscore one‟s commitment to social action. The 
subject constituted and motivated through her practice does not exist apart from the modern forces of state 
aggression, environmental degradation, or global forces of patronage and marketing, but in relation to them. 
The political hope of the book rests on its status as artifact. As a product of the imagination that foregrounds 
awareness and mindfulness of the suffering of material bodies, it creates the possibility of future imaginings 
and, therefore, compassion. What the narrative reveals through mythic history, novelistic and cinematic tropes, 
references to the fantastic, and references to its own overtly collaborative construction, is a different kind of 
truth: not a depiction of authentic Tibetan-ness, although those tropes circulate throughout the book and are 
partially reconstituted even through the arc of this argument, but of another perception of subjectivity and 
sentience developed, in Ani Pachen‟s case, through the clash between Tibetan Buddhism and Chinese 
colonialism. That subjectivity directs its energies toward anti-militaristic and anti-colonial ends, although it 
expresses those ends in the language of compassion, emptiness, and interdependence largely unrecognizable in 
global political or academic discourse. 
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